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Spec sheet 01 / 06 — Research paperAll research ↗

Tokenized Bonds: The Cost of Faster Settlement

Three Hong Kong government issuances show growing execution capacity. A program-cost model tests when repeated issuance and settlement changes produce savings.

Originally published by Panasia Research.

Topic
Tokenized bonds
Published
2026-09-12
Reading
15 min
Sections
10
References
13
Cover
Tokenized Bonds cover: a grayscale financial district with one blue glass towerIUM LABSResearch
Cover artwork and image sources
  • Cover: AI-generated editorial illustration · ium Labs Research.
01 A program can scale before its savings are measured — 02 What the three issuances actually show — 03 A shorter settlement interval is not automatically less funding — 04 How repeated issuance changes the threshold — 05 Grants and economic savings should be reported separately — 06 A liquidity sensitivity can reverse the operating result — 07 The evidence needed to make a savings claim — 08 What This Changes for a Korea Go-to-Market — 09 Conclusion — 10 Method and Limits —
Spec sheet 02 / 06 — Key takeaways

Key takeaways

  1. 01

    The selected government program grew from HKD 0.8bn in 2023 to about HKD 10bn equivalent in 2025. Issue size is not a measure of cost savings. [1] [3]

  2. 02

    The 2025 issue drew subscriptions of over HKD 130bn for about HKD 10bn of bonds. Demand shows execution capacity, not a lower all-in cost. [3]

  3. 03

    With assumed HKD 1.2m integration cost, HKD 300,000 annual maintenance and HKD 100,000 savings per issue, a three-year program breaks even at seven issues per year.

  4. 04

    Faster exchange can still require more funded cash. Measure funding duration, netting and total participant costs alongside execution speed.

  5. 05

    Korea is on its own timetable: token securities amendments passed on January 15, 2026, effective one year after promulgation, and a CBDC-linked treasury bond tokenization pilot is planned from 2027. [11] [12]

Spec sheet 03 / 06 — The paperReading 15 min
10Sections

Hong Kong's government digital-bond program expanded from HKD 800 million in 2023 to approximately HKD 10 billion equivalent in 2025. That is evidence that a sovereign issuer and its intermediaries can execute larger tokenized transactions. It is not, by itself, evidence that tokenization reduces an issuer's all-in cost. This paper asks a more specific question: which costs must fall, for whom, and over how many transactions, before a different settlement architecture pays for itself?

We compare three government issuance announcements, then build two transparent scenarios. The first tests how repeated issuance amortizes integration costs. The second measures how an increase in the cash required for settlement can offset operating savings. The cases document execution; the scenarios identify economic thresholds. No private fee schedules, order-level trading data or controlled conventional-versus-digital experiment are available in the selected record.

01

A program can scale before its savings are measured

For an issuer, a financing cost is not the same as a settlement cost. Coupon pricing reflects maturity, currency, credit, market conditions and investor demand. Legal work, platform integration, custody, reconciliation and paying-agent services are additional costs. A tokenized instrument can change some of those operating tasks while leaving the issuer's fundamental credit unchanged.

The first analytical step is to choose the unit of comparison. This paper uses the incremental cost of operating a recurring issuance program, holding the economic terms of the bonds constant in the illustrative model. That choice avoids treating a different interest-rate environment as a technology benefit. It also makes clear why a small first issue and a large repeat program can reach different conclusions with the same software.

A second boundary is the participant. A process that saves work for an issuer may require new custody or cash arrangements for an investor. A settlement agent can absorb complexity into a fee. A credible cost comparison should record those transfers before describing savings for the market as a whole. We do not assume that all benefits accrue to the party funding the integration.

02

What the three issuances actually show

The February 2023 government announcement describes a one-year HKD 800 million tokenized green bond. Primary issuance used delivery versus payment between securities tokens and cash tokens representing an HKD claim against the HKMA, on a T+1 basis. CMU was the clearing and settlement system, using Goldman Sachs' tokenization platform, GS DAP. The bond priced at 4.05% and was distributed by a four-bank syndicate. These are disclosed architecture and transaction facts, not a published invoice for the infrastructure. [1]

In February 2024, the government announced approximately HKD 6 billion equivalent of two-year digital green bonds across HKD, RMB, USD and EUR, with HSBC Orion as the digital assets platform. The official account highlights a digitally native format and the ability to access the bonds through traditional market infrastructure, such as accounts with Euroclear or Clearstream. Those features broaden the question from whether a token can be issued to how investors reach it. They do not establish that every participant uses a direct blockchain account. [2]

The November 2025 announcement records approximately HKD 10 billion equivalent, again across four currencies, with a T+1 cycle, tenors of up to five years and subscriptions of over HKD 130 billion. For the HKD and RMB tranches, tokenized central bank money, in the form of e-HKD and e-CNY, was an option alongside traditional settlement rails in primary issuance. The announcement also describes links between token identifiers and conventional securities identifiers. It says the option "helped further reduce settlement time, costs and counterparty credit risk," but gives no figure for either the savings or the take-up. It does not say that all four currency tranches settled exclusively in digital central bank money. [3]

AnnouncementApproximate issue size, HKD equivalentDisclosed developmentEconomic question left open
February 2023 [1]0.8bnTokenized securities and cash in primary DvPIncremental integration and operating cost
February 2024 [2]6.0bnFour currencies and digitally native issuanceCost of supporting direct and traditional access
November 2025 [3]10.0bnOptional digital central bank money for two currenciesParticipation and cost by settlement route
Three Hong Kong government digital bond issues, approximate HKD equivalent (Sources: HKSAR Government, February 16, 2023, February 7, 2024 and November 11, 2025)
HKD tranche coupon%
2023, one-year4.05
2025, two-year2.5

Source: HKSAR Government, February 16, 2023 and November 11, 2025

The HKD coupon fell from 4.05% to 2.5%, but the tenor and the rate environment changed too. The gap says nothing about tokenization by itself; the evidence section below explains why such a comparison needs a matched conventional benchmark. [1] [3]

The progression is a selected series for one sovereign program, not a measure of all Asian tokenized bonds. The approximate HKD equivalents are taken from announcements rather than retranslated at a common exchange rate. The three observations also share an issuer and an evolving institutional infrastructure. They cannot be treated as three independent experiments on technology performance.

A February 2026 government reply discusses further development of the bond market and the 2025 tokenized issuance. Its policy context reinforces that public infrastructure development has objectives beyond a single issuer's near-term invoice. We therefore separate demonstration value and market development from recurring commercial savings. Both can be valid objectives, but they require different measures. The reply counts three tranches since 2023, calls the HKD 10 billion issue the world's largest tokenized bond at the time, and mentions exploring how tokenized bonds can be applied at the retail level. [7]

The 2025-26 Budget had already said the Government "will regularise the issuance of tokenised bonds" and would keep encouraging digital bond issues through the grant scheme. [8] A regular program is the condition under which the amortization model below applies.

Hong Kong is not the only public issuer on record. In April 2021 the European Investment Bank issued a EUR 100 million two-year digital bond on Ethereum, with the payment of issue funds represented on the blockchain as Banque de France CBDC. Its release said digitalization "may bring benefits" such as fewer intermediaries, lower fixed costs and faster settlement: a stated possibility, not a measured saving. [9]

03

A shorter settlement interval is not automatically less funding

Delivery versus payment makes the exchange of securities and payment conditional on one another. That reduces exposure to completing only one side of an exchange. It does not answer how much cash each participant must have available at the moment of settlement, whether obligations can be netted, or what happens when a participant cannot deliver.

The BIS's 2020 analysis of securities settlement identifies an important trade-off: tokenized arrangements may increase gross settlement and fragment cash across ledgers, raising liquidity needs. In its words, "Settling trades individually generally requires more liquidity." Its 2023 monetary blueprint likewise notes that atomic settlement can need liquidity-saving mechanisms. We use these arguments as competing hypotheses about architecture, not as observations of the cash usage in Hong Kong's program. [4] [5]

It follows that three clocks should be kept separate: the contractual settlement cycle, the elapsed time to complete an individual exchange, and the interval over which a participant must fund its obligation. T+1 identifies a cycle relative to a transaction date, and conventional markets shorten it without a ledger change: the SEC moved most US broker-dealer securities transactions from T+2 to T+1, with compliance from May 28, 2024. [10] A seconds-long execution at the end of that cycle does not establish that cash was required for only seconds.

The counterfactual is therefore not simply slow versus fast. It is one complete funding and settlement arrangement against another. A conventional netting process can require less cash but defer final exchange. A gross atomic process can complete exchanges quickly but require cash in advance. A design that combines conditional execution with effective netting might improve both. The paper's evidence does not establish which outcome prevailed for every investor in the selected issues. Our companion paper, The Redemption Gap, applies the same cash-at-deadline logic to stablecoins.

04

How repeated issuance changes the threshold

Consider a hypothetical program with the same bond terms and investor access under two operating designs. Let F be an incremental integration cost of HKD 1.2 million, A an annual incremental maintenance cost of HKD 300,000, and H an evaluation period of three years. Assume each issue avoids HKD 180,000 of conventional processing work but adds HKD 80,000 of digital platform, custody and operating charges. Net variable savings S are HKD 100,000 per issue.

Ignoring discounting for this short illustrative comparison, the incremental three-year cost of the digital route is F + H × A − H × N × S, where N is issues per year. A negative number means savings relative to the defined alternative. Break-even issuance frequency is N = (F/H + A) / S = 7 issues per year. These input values are selected assumptions, not fees reported by CMU, HSBC, Goldman Sachs or the government.

Issues per yearThree-year net variable savingsIntegration plus maintenanceIncremental three-year cost
2HKD 0.6mHKD 2.1mHKD 1.5m
4HKD 1.2mHKD 2.1mHKD 0.9m
7HKD 2.1mHKD 2.1mHKD 0.0m
10HKD 3.0mHKD 2.1mHKD -0.9m
Incremental three-year cost of the digital route by issue frequency (ium Labs scenario, HKD)

This simple result explains why an issue-by-issue comparison can mislead. Charging all integration work to the first bond understates the value of reuse. Assuming unlimited reuse understates the risk that a platform, legal structure or investor requirement changes. A defensible program case needs a realistic schedule, consistent scope and a plan for the residual system if issuance stops.

The horizon is itself a sensitivity. With a one-year horizon, the same assumptions need 15 issues to break even. With five years, the annual threshold is 5.4 issues, which means at least six whole issues a year under a uniform schedule. The change is arithmetic, not a forecast of adoption. Technology replacement, maintenance escalation and discounting would make a long-horizon estimate more demanding.

Issue size matters only through the costs it actually changes. Doubling principal does not automatically double a fixed legal or integration saving. A percentage-based custody charge does scale with principal. Separate fixed, per-issue, per-investor and proportional costs rather than force them into one basis-point number. Otherwise a larger bond can look more efficient simply because a fixed cost was divided by a larger denominator.

05

Grants and economic savings should be reported separately

Hong Kong launched its Digital Bond Grant Scheme in November 2024, with a maximum grant of HKD 2.5 million per eligible issuance subject to the scheme's requirements. Applications opened for an initial period of three years. That is a policy instrument with eligibility conditions, not an automatic payment to every digital bond. Our model does not assume the maximum grant or determine whether an issuer qualifies. [6]

A subsidy can improve the issuer's cash economics while leaving the underlying resources consumed by the process unchanged. Report both numbers: the operating comparison before subsidy, and the issuer's out-of-pocket comparison after an actually approved amount. A business that only breaks even with support may still be worth piloting, but its recurring commercial case should not be presented as already proven.

For illustration only, a one-time HKD 600,000 contribution toward the model's integration cost would lower the three-year frequency threshold from seven to five issues per year. That is (600,000 / 3 + 300,000) / 100,000 after reducing F to HKD 600,000. It is not an estimate of an award under the actual scheme. Timing of receipt and eligibility expenditure would need to be added to a real cash-flow model.

The same discipline applies to internal cross-subsidy. If a platform provider discounts an initial program to establish market share, the buyer's current contract may be attractive. The undiscounted recurring service still needs a credible business model. Research should identify the contractual duration of the discount and show the threshold after it expires instead of treating a launch promotion as a permanent structural saving.

06

A liquidity sensitivity can reverse the operating result

Now isolate one investor's settlement funding. Suppose the old arrangement requires HKD 20 million of cash for one calendar day, while the new arrangement requires HKD 100 million for the same day. At an assumed annual funding rate of 4%, the additional funding cost is (100m − 20m) × 4% / 365 = HKD 8,767.12. The 80% reduction implicit in the old arrangement is an assumption used to test netting; it is not measured in the government issues.

If the new design shortens the period requiring the full HKD 100 million to 0.2 of a calendar day, the two arrangements have equal cash-time exposure in this simplified model. Shorter than that, the digital route uses less funded cash-time; longer than that, it uses more. A unit conversion is essential: calendar-day fractions in an ACT/365 calculation should not be substituted directly for a platform's operating hours or business-day cutoff.

New route funding intervalCost on HKD 100m at 4%Old route: HKD 20m for one dayIncremental funding cost
0.1 dayHKD 1,095.89HKD 2,191.78HKD -1,095.89
0.2 dayHKD 2,191.78HKD 2,191.78HKD 0.00
0.5 dayHKD 5,479.45HKD 2,191.78HKD 3,287.67
1.0 dayHKD 10,958.90HKD 2,191.78HKD 8,767.12
Funding cost of one settlement at 4% a year, ACT/365 (ium Labs scenario, HKD)

This sensitivity is a participant-level comparison. It should not be added mechanically to the issuer program model because the costs may fall on different entities and because netting benefits can be redistributed. A market-wide study would consolidate participants, remove transfers such as one party's fee and another party's revenue where appropriate, and retain real resource and financing costs without double-counting.

A credit facility can also reduce prefunding without eliminating its price. Count commitment charges, drawn interest and collateral requirements. If funding is free only under a central bank pilot or an internal treasury policy, document that condition. The useful design question is how fast exchange, netting, collateral and cash availability work together, not whether an isolated ledger records transfers quickly. Our paper on tokenized money funds prices days of faster cash access with the same ACT/365 arithmetic.

07

The evidence needed to make a savings claim

A stronger empirical study would compare repeat issues with similar currency, tenor, size, rating, investor mix and market conditions. Collect legal and platform invoices, custody arrangements, internal staff time, failed-settlement interventions and paying-agent costs. Document whether any task has been eliminated, automated, shifted to another organization or retained as a parallel control.

Settlement data should include funding arrival, securities availability, final exchange and the time funds can be reused. Report the distribution, not only the best execution. Count exception cases and specify whether the obligation is gross or net. Separate primary issuance from secondary trading: a successful primary distribution cannot establish liquid resale markets or low bid-ask spreads afterwards.

For financing cost, match against a credible conventional benchmark rather than compare coupons from different years. A spread difference can reflect supply, scarcity, investor preferences or subsidy as well as process changes. If there is no convincing counterfactual, publish the spread as an observation and leave its cause open. A regression with too few or poorly matched issues would create apparent precision without identifying tokenization's effect.

The central hypothesis is testable: repeated use should improve economics where reusable fixed work is material and net variable savings remain positive. It would weaken if integrations had to be rebuilt for each issue or if investor-support costs rose enough to offset automation. The liquidity hypothesis would weaken where the new design preserves netting or sharply shortens required cash holding. Those are specific observations a subsequent study could obtain.

08

What This Changes for a Korea Go-to-Market

Korea's National Assembly passed the token securities amendments to the Electronic Securities Act and the Capital Markets Act on January 15, 2026. The Electronic Securities Act change lets a distributed ledger serve as the electronic registration account book, which permits securities to be issued as tokens, and the FSC says the format can apply to all securities, debt securities included, though it expects active use in new types such as investment contract securities. The law takes effect one year after promulgation, which the FSC put tentatively at January 2027. [11] On July 14, 2026 the government's growth strategy added a blockchain-based treasury bond tokenization pilot linked to the Bank of Korea's institutional CBDC, to start in 2027. [12] That resembles the arrangement the BIS sketches, with tokenized central bank reserves, commercial bank money and government bonds on one unified ledger. [13] Our July paper, Japan Just Made Crypto a Financial Product, covers the same growth strategy.

  • Vendors pitching Korean issuers or securities firms. Lead with the program math, not issue size: the issue frequency at which integration pays back, and who funds it.
  • Projects offering on-chain settlement to Korean institutions. Put funding windows, netting and cash-time next to execution speed. A CBDC-linked pilot will meet the liquidity question raised above. [4] [5]
  • Korean marketing materials. Do not cite Hong Kong's issue sizes or subscription totals as proof of savings. They show execution capacity.

None of this is legal advice. Whether a given token is a security under the amended acts is a question for a Korean lawyer.

09

Conclusion

The research does not establish that tokenization is cheaper or more expensive in general. It establishes why the answer depends on program frequency, reusable work, investor access and cash-time exposure. The reviewed issuance record supports the ability to execute and extend tokenized structures. A publishable claim of savings requires the next layer of evidence: matched costs and funding outcomes over the full lifecycle, including the work that remains outside the ledger.

10

Method and Limits

The corpus consists of three official issuance accounts, one government policy reply, the 2025-26 Budget, one grant announcement, three BIS analyses, and releases from the European Investment Bank, the US SEC and Korea's FSC, plus one Korean press report: thirteen sources. This is a purposive study of a Hong Kong program, not an Asian market census. The announcements are informative about structure and scale but do not contain the cost dataset necessary for a causal estimate. Approximate issue sizes are deliberately not converted into a total-market growth rate.

All monetary scenarios are ium Labs calculations. The models use simple ACT/365 funding cost, no compounding, a fixed issuance schedule and constant assumed fees. They omit taxes, credit losses, software replacement, legal changes and residual asset value. Their purpose is to show thresholds and accounting boundaries, not to predict the economics of a named platform.

The paper is written as of September 12, 2026 and uses only material published on or before that date. Still uncertain: the 2025 announcement does not say how many investors chose tokenized central bank money; no issuer or participant cost data were available; and the Korean pilot is known only through a press report of the growth strategy.

Spec sheet 04 / 06 — References

References

13Sources

[1]HKSAR Government. 2023-02-16. HKSAR Government's Inaugural Tokenised Green Bond Offering. info.gov.hk.

[2]HKSAR Government. 2024-02-07. HKSAR Government's Digital Green Bonds Offering. info.gov.hk.

[3]HKSAR Government. 2025-11-11. HKSAR Government's Third Digital Green Bonds Offering. info.gov.hk.

[4]Bank for International Settlements. 2020-03. On the future of securities settlement. bis.org.

[5]Bank for International Settlements. 2023-06. Blueprint for the future monetary system: improving the old, enabling the new. bis.org.

[6]Hong Kong Monetary Authority. 2024-11-28. HKMA launches Digital Bond Grant Scheme. info.gov.hk.

[7]HKSAR Government. 2026-02-04. LCQ12: Consolidating Hong Kong's position as a bond market hub. info.gov.hk.

[8]HKSAR Government. 2025-02-26. The 2025-26 Budget, Budget Speech: International Financial Centre (paragraphs 73-104). budget.gov.hk.

[9]European Investment Bank. 2021-04-28. EIB issues its first ever digital bond on a public blockchain. eib.org.

[10]U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2023-02-15. SEC Finalizes Rules to Reduce Risks in Clearance and Settlement. sec.gov.

[11]Financial Services Commission (Korea). 2026-01-15. 토큰증권 도입 및 투자계약증권 유통을 위한 「전자증권법」·「자본시장법」 개정안 국회 본회의 통과. fsc.go.kr.

[12]ET News (전자신문). 2026-07-14. 비트코인 현물 ETF, 국내 상장 길 열린다…정부 하반기 도입 추진 (the 2026 second-half economic growth strategy). etnews.com.

[13]Bank for International Settlements. 2025-06. The next-generation monetary and financial system. bis.org.

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